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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, and THE BOARD OF REVIEW, APPEALS REFEREE and
CLAIMS SUPERVISOR of its DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT'
SECURITY,

Resp ondents & Appellees.
1

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
CLYDE, MECHAM & WHITE,
Attorneys for Petitioners
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
OLOF NELSON CONSTRUCTION CO~I
PANY, VINCENT-PETERSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, GRONEMAN & COMPANY, YOUNG & S.MITH
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, UTAH
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,

Petitioners & Appellants,
-vs.-

Case No. 7633

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, and THE BOARD OF REVIEW, APPEALS REFEREE and
CLAIMS :SUPERVISOR of its DEpARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY,

Respondents & Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
NA·TURE OF CASE
The Petitioners filed an appeal with the Industrial
Commission of Utah, Unemployment Compensation APpeals Referee contesting the payment of unemployment
compensation to eight claimants covering a period from
June 2, 1950 to June 8, 1950. The Claimants were employees of the Peti·tioners during this period.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Petitioners contended that the Claimants were
on strike within the· meaning of Chapter 42-2a-5 (d) (1)
Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended, the Employment
Security Act.
The Appeals Referee ruled that the eight claimants
were not on strike, that the stoppage of work was not due
to a strike at the factory or establishment where claimants were last employed, and that benefit payments would
be 'allowed for the period in question.
In accordance with 42-2a-10 Utah Code Annotated
1943 as ·arnende~d, the deeision of the Appeals Referee was
appea1ed to the Board uf Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah. Without granting oral arguments orallowing the submission ·o:f brief 'On appeal 'Said Board
of Revi·ew ruled: ''In view of the fact that there have
been two previous decisions, it is the, decision of this
Board of Review that any further hearing on appeal
be and is hereby denie'd. ''
Petitioners, as emplo)Tier contributors under the Employment Security ~ct then petitioned the· Supreme
Court of Utah to compel respondent Commission et. al.
to show cause why its decision awarding henefits to
claimants herein, should not be vacated and to remove
from the Petiti!one:rs accounts maintained by the Respondents he·rein all charge's ma:de against the said accounts on ·aooount ~of benefits tp1aid to any of said claimants during the period of the strike herein involved to wit
June 2, 1950 to June 8, 1950 inclusive.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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THE FACT'S
Each of the Petitioners is a General Contractor,
engaged in General Building, Highway or Heavy construction business in the State of Utah. Each of said
Petitioners employ construction workers who are members of local American Federation of Labor unions.
All of the eight. claimants (Joseph B. Allman, Cornell B. Cameron, Owen E. Cameron, George E. Cloward,
Harold L. Garrard, Charlie Martinez, Reed H. Nielson
and Ronald Murray Ross) are members of one of the six
basic craft local unions., namely ( 1) International Hod
Carriers, Building and Common Laborers Union, (2)
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America, (3) International Union of Operating Engineers, ( 4) International Brotherhood of Te·amsters
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Ameri-ca, ( 5)
International Association of Bridge, Structural and
Ornamental Iron Workers, and (6) Operative Plasterers
and Cement Finishers International Association, hereinafter referred to as the Unions, (R-2)*. The Unions
are the recognized bargaining representatives of the
Claimants (R-13) and each of said Claimants were at
the times herein mentioned employees of one of the petitioners- (R-7 Department's Exhibit N·o. 1, Paragraph
#7) (R-10 Appellant's Exhibit No.3, Labor Agreement,
See Article II thereof).

* R-Refers

to Reporters Transcript.
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The Petitioners. are members of the Associated Gene·ral
Contractors of America, Intermountain Branch, (R-2)
a "legally organized Trade Association composed of approximately seventy-five members and having as its
territory the State of Utah, hereinafter referred to as
the Association. The Pe'titioners are signators and
legally bound under the terms of a labor agreement dated
August 12, 1949 and negotiated by the Association as the
designated collective bargaining representative 'Of Petitioners. (R-7 Department's Exhibit No.1 Paragraph#7)
(See R-lO.Appellant's Exhibit No. 3 Labor Agreement,
Article II thereof quoted as follows)"ARTICLE II
BARGAINING RECOGNITION
"A. The Contractors recognize the Unions
signatory hereto as the collective bargaining representa;tives of their employees over whom the
Unions have jurisdiction.
"B. The Unions hereby recognize and acknowle!dge that the Associated General Contractors of America, Intermountain Branch, include
in its membership a majority of the individual
Contractors in the general, highway, building and
heavy construction industry and said contr,actors
are performing the greater percentage of work
therein, and by reason of such facts, the Unions
hereby recognize the Associated General Contractors of America, Intermountain Bran~h, as
the collective, bargaining representa;tive fior its
membership in the gener,al, highway, building and
heavy construction industry in the, te:rritory subject to this Agreement.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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''C. This Agreement shall not apply to executives, civil engineers, arrd their helpers, superintendents, assistant superintendents, master
mechanics, timekeepers, messenger boys, office
workers, confidential employe~es or any employees
of the Contractors above the rank of craft foreman.
''D. The wage rates, working conditions,
·and hours of employment, herein provided have
been negotiated by the Unions exclusively with
the representatives of the Contractors. The
Unions agree that in the event that during the life
of this agreement it should make any agreement
with any person, firm, association or corporation
providing wage rates, working conditions and
hours of employment more favorable to s~aid other
person, firm, association, or corporation than is
provided in this agreement for Contractors, then
and in that event any member of Associated
General Contractors of America, Intermountain
Branch, engaging in work of the ty1pe covered by
any such agreement shall have the benefits of any
such more favorable wage rates, working conditions, and 'hours of employment when performing
such work.''
The said Contractors Association was organized in
1922 and since that time has repreS"ented its memhers in
collective bargaining matters with the said unions (R-11
Appellants exhibit No. 4 ''Constitution ·and By Laws,
Page 13 & 14) (R-7 Department's Exhibit No. 1 Stipulation of Fact). The collective' bargaining r'elpres·entatives
of the contractors and workmen, respectively, have for
the past several years negotiated a so~call'ed ''master''
or ''industry-wide'' contract covering the hours, wages
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and working conditi·ons for construction workers in the
State of Utah. All of the labor negotiations leading to
the labor contr·aets negotiate·d over the past several years
were conducted exclusively by the Association and the
U ni·orns, and the said labor contracts, when executed, imposed identical conditions of wages, hours and working
conditions upon each of the petitioners and were applicable ·to all n1emhers of the· aforesaid six basic cr·aft
A.F.L. Unions. (R-7 Department's Exhibit No.1, Stipulation of Fact) (R-22)
On August 12, 1949 the current labor agreement was
executed by and between the Unions and the Association.
The term of this labor agreement was two years, from
AuguS't 12, 1949 to. June 1, 1951. This ·agreement contained a :clause to permit opening for Imgortiation of
wages only on June 1, 1950. (R-10 Appellant's Exhibit
No.3) On February 27, 1950, the Secretary of the Building Trades Council of Utah repTesenting the Unions
advised the Association that in a0cordance with Article
IX Section A of the Labor Agreement, n'otices were given
on behalf of the Unions of their desire to negotiate an
increase in wages only. (R-7 Department's Exhibit No.
1) The labor agreement by its terms had not expired,
(R-10, 21) (R-45) and the Unions did not demand a
change in any 'of the provisions of the agreement othell'
than wages. Thereafter, on March 9, the Ass·ocia;tion requested a collective harga:ining meeting with the Unions.
By an exchange of ~orreslpondence between the Association and the Unions, the first collective bargaining
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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meeting was set for April 4, 1950. The sooond such meeting ()C(?urred April 26, 1950. A tl1ird such meeting o~
curred :May 26, 1950. The bargaining reached an impasse but notwithstanding two further m·eetings were
held, one on ~lay 29 ·and the other on ~lay 31. No agreement as to wages was reached by ~lay 31, 1950, and thereafter on June 1, the Unions notified the Association that
pickets would be placed at the Ellis W. Barker Company
Professional Building job in Salt Lake City and the Earl
S. P·aul Company job in Ogden. Thereafter, on June 2,
1950, ·such picketing (strike ootion) did commence on
these two specific jobs, and by this ·ruction all work
s·topped and ·all workmen refused to work. The Unions
had been no,tified during the course of the nego...
tiations both ·by letter (R-7 Department's. Exhibit
No. 1). and by newspaper articles that a strike
or a picket line appearing on any construction project
of any member of the Association who was a signator to
the labor agreement would be regarded as a picket and
a strike against the entire Association as the recognized
bargaining unit. (R-11, 16, 17, 18 & 19) (R-35 & 36·) (R38, 39) The !picket lines 'appeared on only two of the
members of the 'bargaining unit and between June 2,
1950, and June 5, 1950, all other members of the Asso-

ciation who were signators rto the Labor Agreement
numbering approximately seventy 8ignator members
closed dorwn their construction projects ·and laid the
workmen off their jobs. 'The strike was regarded as a
strike 'against the bargaining unit. (R-7 Department's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Exhibit No. 1) (R-16-19, 22, 23) (R-50, 51) (R-56) The
Claimants became unemployed because of this action. The
pieket line around the two aforesaid construction projects
was 0omposed of members of the Unions.
At no time during any of the negotia,tions did the
Unions make any separate proposals to any individual
memhe·r of the Association ( R-20, 48) and at all times
all the said prolposals were made to the Association only
and for the purpose of securing increased wages for each
and all of the members of the Unions including the
Claimants. (R-23)
Subsequent to said strike action, meetings were held
under the auspices of the United States Labor Conciliation Service and the Industrial Commission of Utah
between the Association and the Unions rand during none
of ·the said meetings or negotiations were any individual
proposals made to any individual member of the Association or was rany ind~cation given by the Unions that
the said wage controversy could be settled 'by ra separate
wage settlement with etither of the two· struck companies,
the Ellis W. Barker Oompany or the Earl S. Paul Company. (R-21) As :a matter of fact there was a slow down
on some jobs during the period of negotiations and just
prior to the shutdown. (R-23, 24, 25) (R-57, 58) The said
strike was en:ded on or about June 7, 1950, ~as a result
of an agreement to increa;se. wages only in the said
Mruster Labor Agreement oif' August 12, 1949. This wage
increase affected all construction workers and included
the Clraimants herein. ( R-23, 64, 66, 97)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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THE ISSUE
Are the Claimants entitled to unemployment compensation when they became unemployed because of
their strike against the bargaining unitY
Claimants were m·embers of the Unions.
Claimants appointed the Unions to represent them
for purposes of bargaining.
Claimants received an increase in wage as a result
of their strike action.

ARGUMENT
POINT I-THE LABOR AGREEMENT DATED AUGUST
12, 1949, WAS BINDING UPON THE ASSOCIATION (PETITIONERS) AND UNIONS AT ALL TIMES HEREIN AND
DURING THE PERIOD OF THE STRIKE.

By the terms of the Labor Agreement o_f August 12,
1949 the-parties were legally bound to recognize the bargaining unit until ·the expiration of the agreement in
June 1951. This bargaining unit could not be dissolved
short of breach of contract. (See Article II of Labor
Agreement, supra.) Respondents contend fuat the 'Strike
dissolved ·fue bargaining unit 'and because of thi's fact
re,cognition by the respective parties under Article II
of the agreement was of no legal effect. The parties
regarded the Labor Agreement enforceable in every respect but wages. By the terms of the agreement the
recognition clause was not voided by the strike and it
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
logically foillows, that a ·strike ~against this legally recognized bargaining unit during June of 1950 was economic
action again'st the entire uni't.
The Unions during the strike did not deny recognition of the Associa:tion as the bargaining unit. This same
legal status would pe:rhaps rrot obtain were the two
parties renegotiating all of the terms of the agre·ement
at the expiration of said Agreement.
The Respondents take the position that the entire
contract was being renegotiated at the time of the strike
and, therefore, the bargaining unit was dissolved at the
time sai'd strike occurred.
The two struck companies were by contract legally
bound 'to recognize the bargaining unit and could only
legally negotiate through the recognized unit. This same
condition ·existed for all signators to the Agreement both
contractors :and Unions and involved Claimants as members of the Unions.
A strike against one member of the bargaining unit
was fuererore a strike 'against the entire unit. The
claimants held membership in this unit ·and were aooordingly ineligible to re~eive uneiD!ployment 'benefits because
the strike involved their grade, class ·or group at the
es'tablisbments where they were last employed and the
strike was fomented hy workers of an employer who
were partie's to such p:Jan to foment the ·strike. (See
42-·2a-5 (d) (1) U.C.A. 1943 'as 'amended infra.)t
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POINT II-A STRIKE AGAINST TWO MEMBERS OF
A BARGAINING UNIT IS A STRIKE AGAINST THE
ENTIRE BARGAINING UNIT AND CLAIMANTS WHO
ARE INTERESTED AND BENEFIT BY THE STRIKE ARE
OF THE GRADE, CLASS OR GROUP AND INELIGIBLE FOR
COMPENSATION WITHIN THE MEANING OF 42-2a-5 (d)
(1), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1943, EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT.

42-2a-5 Provides :

''An individual shall be ineligible for benefits
or for purposes of establishing a waiting peri'od:
'' (d) For any week in which it i'S found by
the commission that his unemployment is due to a
stoppage of work which exists becauS'e of a strike
involving his grade, class, or group of workers a.t
the factory or establishment at which he is or
was last employed.
"(I) If the commission, upon invesrtigation,
shall find that a strike ha;s been fomented by a
worker of am,y employer, none 'of the workers of
the grade, class, or group of workers of the individual who is fo-und to be a party to such plan,
or agreement to foment a strike, shall be eligible
for benefits; tprovided, however, that if the Comnriss~on, upon investigation, shall find that such
strike is caused by the failure or refusal of any
employer to conform to the provi·sions of any law
of the State of Uta;h or of the United States pertaining to hours, wages, or other conditions of
work, such strike shall not render the workers in·eligible for benefits.''

The unemployment compensation statutes o.f all 48
states contain provisions disqualifying claimants whose
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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unemployment is the result of a labor dispute. While
most labor dispute disqualification clauses are made applicable to labor disputes, several use different phra.seology:
California-'' (trade dispute)''
Colorado-'' ('strike)''
Kentucky-'' (strike or other bona fide labor dispute)''
New York-'' ('Strike, l·ockout or industrial controversy)''
Rhode Island-" (strike or industrial controversy)"
Utah-" (strike involving grade, class or group of
workers)''

TheS'e differences, however, have not proven significant even where disqualification is limited by statute
to strike. SandovlJial v. Indlustrial Commission, (Colorado)
130 P (2d) 930; Block Coal 0o11'1llAG!I'I!JJ v. U.M.W., (TenneS'see) 148 'S.W. (2d) 364; Miners v. Hix, (West Virginia) 17 S.E. (2d) 810.
A strike is defined 'as follows by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947:
''·The term strike includes any strike or other
concerted stoppage of work by employees (including the s!toppage by reason of the expiration of a
~oUective bargaining agreement) and a concerted
slowdown :or o'ther concerted interrup:ti'on of ope'rations. by employees.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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A labor dispute is defined by the National Labor
Relations Act as amen'ded as follows:
''The term labor dispute includes a contro'versy concerning terms, tenure or c:ond~tions o.f
e1nployment, or concerning the association or representation of pers'ons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of employment, regardless
of whether the disputants stand in the proxim'ate
relation of employer and employee.''
A strike is the outgrowth of a labor dispute and in
a sense the terms "strike" and "labor dispute" are
similar. A strike only occurs after the existence of a
labor dispute.
In recent years the increas~d frequency of large
scale industrial controversies has sharply accentuated
the proiblem of the applicability of disqualification provisions to claimants wh01se unemployment, while resulting
from a labor dispute orr strike is wholly involuntary.
Claimants in the instant case received the benefit of the
wage increase· resulting f'rom their strike, their duly
appointed representatives ealled the: strike against the
two members of the bargaining unit, and for that reason
their

unempl'O~ent

was, perhaps., not involuntary.

The most commonly advanced justification of the
labor dispute 'd.'isqualific:a;tion is that no rp1erson should
be :allowed to receive benefits while unemployed as a
result of his oiWn voluntary a,cts. D-epartment of IndusSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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trial ReZatvovrvs v. Pesnell, (Alabama) 199 Southern 726;
Swunde.rs v. MarylJa;n;d Uwemployment Compensation
Bola'rd,, 53 .AJtl. (2nd) 579; Deshler Bro·om Factory v.
Kinney, (Nebraska) 2 N.W. (2d) 332 and 336.

The Unions, in this case ordered a strike o.f only two
construction firms hoping to he secure in the lmowle'dge
tha:t such 'a cours·e would as effectively induce a complete
work stoppage as would a strike against all members of
the bargaining unit and that state benefi1t payments of
all non-striking members would appreciably lessen the
drain upon the: union '•s treasury by requiring the union
to finance only a small scale strike. As a matter of fact,
the Unions knew and had been notified several times
during nego1tiations that a strike against one would be
considered a strike against all. This matter is discussed
in Chrysler v. Smith, 298 N.W. 87. In re 8t. PO!Ul &
TaJcoma Lumber Company 110 P. (2d) 877; Spielman v.
Industrial Commission of Wisoonsin, 295 N.W. 1.
The statutes (including the Utah statute) uniformly
provide that claimants will not come within the disqualification clause me,rely hecaus·e a labor dispute or strike
exists, but will be ineligible for benefits only if the dispute bears a causal relationship to their unemployment.
The question of disqualification of empiJ.oyees of a
branch plant of a corporrution located in another city but
affiliated with an installati:on under separrute labor
agreement where a labor dispute occurred has be·en
litigated :only once, and in tha:t case affiliates were regarded as a single employer and the claimants disqualiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
fied, Spi.elman r. Indu.strial Commission o1 Wisconsin,
295 N."\V. 1. All of the statutes in the United S1ta:tes, including Utah, which exempt claimants from the operation
of labor dispute disqualification clau::;es universally eontain exen1ption upon their non-participation in the dispute. See Utah Statute supra: " ... group of workers
of the individual who is found to be a party to such a
plan ... '' Even statutes which without any further qualification allow benefits to claimants ·who do not belong
to a grade or class of employees any of whose members
are participating in financing, or directly interested in
a labor dispute, implicitly embody a requirement of nonparticipation, since a claimant who is himself participating in the labor dispute will nooessarily be a member of
such a grade or group. It is clear, for e)rample·, that disqualification as a participant may extend nolt only to
persons refusing to work because of their own labor dispute, but alsn to those who iperf'oTm some other voluntary
act making the dispute of others their own. Barnes v.
U.C.B. (Pennsylvania Superior Court) 33 Atl. (2d)
258, 1943.

Even in jurisdictions whose statutes embody exceptions to the labor dispute disqualifications, a claimant,
although not participating in the dispute, cannot bring
himself within these exceptions. if he is direetly intel"ested
in it. (See the Utah s'tatute aforesaid). When the, succes·s of a labor dispute would have inured to the benefit
of the· claimant in the fo:rm of higher wages., whether
claimant was Union or non-Union, the plaimant is generSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ally held to be directly interested in the dispute, Huiet
v. Boyd, (Ga. 1941) 13 S.E. (2d) 863; Cas'e 18222, 11 B.S.
10-57, Illinois, (Ill. R 1948); Case No. 12589, 11 B.S.
7-66, (Kansas R 1947). It is immaterial whether in fact
the dispute has, been attend~d by success · or failure.
Nobes v. U.C.C., (Michigan) 1946, 21 N.W. (2d) 820.
It appears from unconflicting ·evidence taken by said
Re:sponderrts, that the Claimants and each of them left
their work for your Petitioners because 'Of -a wage dispute
between your Petitioners :and their Unions, and because
their Unions picketed two construction firms who were
signators to their labor agreement and who weTe parties
to their ~ollective bargaining unit, and Slaid Claimants
and each of them thereafter continued out of work until
June 8, 1950, by reason of the fact that the said wage
dispute whi·ch fomented the ~strike was ~still in active
progress in the es~ablis.hments im which they were last
employed. The said Respondents, the Appeals Board
and Board of Review thereof abused its discretion in that
the decision to award benefits to the said Claimants was
not ·supported by the findings, and the findings are no:t
supported by the evidence, and upon legal conclusion
which were and -are wholly erroneous.
The Supreme Cou:r!t of Oalifornia in a case involving
a simllar factual situation ruled on Beptembe~r 14, 1949
that a strike :against one member of a collective bargaining unit was -a strike against all members of the unit and
accordingly claimants £or unemployment compensation
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were ineligible 'to draw benefits during the period of the
strike. McKiniey v. Californi.a Employment Stabilization Commi.ssiovn, 209 Pac. (2d) 602.
Section 56 of the California Unemployment Insurance Act a:s amended provides: ''An individual is not
eligible ror benefits for unemployment, and no such benefits shall be ~payable to him under any of the following
conditions: (a) If he left his work because of a trade
dispute and for the period during which he continues out
of work by reason o.f the foot that the tr;ade dispute is
still in active progress in the establishment in which he is
employed.''
Construing the terms ''trade dispute'' and ''·strike''
to be similar in meaning then ~t follows the Utah s:tatute
and the Galifonria statute are closely related in meaning.
For construction of the term ''establishment'' see
Chrysler v. Smith, 298 N.W. 89 at page 91.
In the Gali£ornia ~se, supra, the Un~on had been
notified that a ·strike against one would be regarded as
a strike against all. Thls same condition existed in the
instant case. The !Supreme C'Ourt of California stated as.
follows on page 304:
''Either the union or an individual employ~r,
at any time, could have bfloken off joint negotia:tions and bargained with its •employees on an
individual bas'is. But that course was not taken.
At no time did the. union purport to be directing
any action. solely 'against the Butte~r Cream plant;
ins!tead, the union continued throughout to deal
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directly with the ~ssociation for the purp'os·e of
obtaining a new ma)s'ter contract. To say, therefo·re, that the a~t of striking the one plarrt did not
shut down work in olther 1p~ants of the association
which were subje;ct to the labor negotiations for
the purpo·se of obtaining a master contract is
wholly unroolistic ...
''The vtolitional test established in Bo!dison
Mfg. Co., v. Oalifornia Emp. Com., 17 Cal. 2d 321
(109 P. 2d 935), was based upon the prin~iple that
inrrocenlt victims of a trade dispute should not
suffer loss of their unemployment insuranc.e
rights."
However the instant case is even stronger because
not only was multiple ·a)sso·ciation wide bargaining continued and no demands made to the individual members
of the asS'oci'ation, but 'all parties were contractually
hound to continue to recognize each other until ·the expiration date of the contract in 1951.
In the M cKilnley case, supra, the. court stated that
there must be a direct causal connection between the
trade 'dispute and the leaving of work. The evidence of
causal :connection in the instant case is clear and undisputed.
This court has sipoken on this subject and construed
the applicable section 'Of ·our employment security act
in the ease of Iron Workers Unio·YIJ v. The Industrial
Commission, 104 Utah 242. Thi'Sr case involved two competing unions where one union placed a pieket line around
a plant in Provo and the memheTs of the other union
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refused to cross said line and thereby became unemployed. Justice :JicDonoug-h in construing 42-2a-5 (d) ( 1)
U.C.A. 19-!3 and ruling on eligibility of daimants for
unemployment cmnpensation in that case stated as follows:
"·The members of the Iron Workers' Union
contend that they are entitled to benefits for the
time they lost by reason of the strike, even if the
members of the S.W.O.C. cannot ~ollect any benefits. They point out that they were n'ot permitted
to vote on the strike; that !they had nothing to do
with calling it, but that they were prevented from
entering the plant by an effective picket line.
They further contend that they were not o.f the
grade, class, or group of worker:s which was involved in the strike because they had no voice in
negotiations and had no voice in dclermining
wh~ther or not there would be a strike. In :f:act
they claim they were opposed to the strike 'and
should not be penalized by the acts beyond their
control.''
(In the case at bar the claimants we·re members of
the Unions involved in the strike, were not opposed to
the picket lines, were benefited by recei~ng a wage increase and were of the group of workers involve'd in
the strike.)·
Justice McDonough further states :
''However, it must he remembered that the
S.W.O.C. by virtue ·of winning the C!otnsent election
became the sole bargaining agent for all of the
employe·es, including members of the Iron
Workers' Union.''
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(By way of further comment the Unions in the case
at bar were bound hy contract as a unit for collective
bargaining, and had a long experience of collective
bargaining with the Associa:tion.)
Justice McDonough in construing the applicable
Utah statute further stated:
''If a strike involves his 'grade, class oT
group' of workers, an employee is ineligible for
unemployment benefits when stoppage of work is
'caused' by members thereof.''
(N·ote that the court refers Ito members.)
''. . . A strike involves the 'grn.de, clas'S or
group,' of an employee witllin the meaning of the
statute if ·the dispute which results. in the strike
is with r~ference to wages, hours o:r conditions of
employment of a group •orf which he is a member.
True, a 'cla:ss, grade or group' may be coextensive with a particular union membership, but !this
is not :rieces'sarily so. In the instant case the members of the Iron Workers' Union were dissident
members of a 'group' involved in the strike;
nevertheless they were members of the 'group'
which was involved in the !Strike. The provisions
of (d) (1) hereinabove quoted, providing that
where a strike is fomented by an employee, the
workers who are o.f his 'grade, clas's, or groulp'
are ineligible ror benefits serves to make cle•ar
that the cons·tructi!on here given of the quoted
words voices t:he legislative intent. It is not only
those wlvo foment the str'ike or bring it about who
are. ineligible:, but the. group to wnich such persons
belong-however imclusive-the grraup for whose
benefit the svrike is c.alled ... The statute grants
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an exemption from the general disqualifying provisions 'applicable to persons out of employment
by reason 'Of a strike, to those who are not directly
interested in or participating in or financing the
strike, arrd ·who do not belong to 'a grade or cla;ss
of ·workers, any of whom participate in, or financ~, ur are directly in!terested in the· dispute.
The Georgia Court of Appeal·s held 'that there
was 'sufficient evidence to show tha:t claimants
were disqualified to receive benefits because they
were interested in the outcome of the strike by
reason ·of the bearing it had on wages o.f claimants. 'The c'Ourt held it was immaterial whether
they were members of any union.''
We respectfuly submit the Respondents erred in
granting Uneiillployment Compensation to the Claimants herein 13Jld in charging the accounts 1of the Peltitioners therefur.
Respeetfully submitted,

CLYDE, MECHAM & WHITE,
.AUorneys for Petitioners

407 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
By Allen E. Mecham
A tt;O'rney at Law
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